New Home Office/UK Borders Agency Country of Origin Information Report regarding Syria
The Home Office/UK Borders Agency has prepared an updated Country of Origin Information Report regarding Syria, dated 3 September 2010.
The full report can be accessed here: [Moved to ....]
http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/policyandlaw/guidance/coi
Kurdish political activists
15.25 The May 2010 report, Human rights issues concerning Kurds in Syria, on the joint fact finding mission by the Danish Immigration Service (DIS) and ACCORD/Austrian Red Cross to Syria, Lebanon, and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) from 21 January to 8 February 2010, noted that a Western diplomatic source believed “…the number of members of Kurdish political parties in Syria is approximately 10,000 … .” [60a] (p21) The same source further stated that there were about 14 Kurdish political parties and “… estimated that the number of members and sympathizers of Kurdish political parties is approximately 60,000. These 60,000 person[s] are able to mobilize thousands more in connection with Kurdish cultural activities such as Nowruz.” [60a] (p21)
The report also noted that, “According to Rachel Raenell Bernu, Kurdish Human Rights Project, London, the Kurdish political parties are fairly well organised within the context in which they work, but they are ever changing names and make?up. It was added that there are 12 or 13 Kurdish political parties for a relatively small group.” [60a] (p21)
See also Annex B – Political organisations
15.26 The HRW November 2009 report, Group Denial – Repression of Kurdish Political and Cultural Rights in Syria, reported:
“In early June 2004, three months after the March 2004 events, officers in Military Intelligence reportedly summoned three Kurdish leaders to warn them that all Kurdish parties in Syria had to cease their political and cultural activities; otherwise, the government would treat them like members of other banned parties. In response to that warning, leaders of 12 unlicensed Kurdish political parties held a meeting in Qamishli on June 15 and issued a statement. They asserted their right to continue their activities and that their lack of legal status was due to the absence of a ‘law organizing political parties’; they noted that all parties in Syria, including those in power, were unlicensed.” [39d] (p18)
See also Increased opposition and subsequent clampdown: 2003–2007
15.27 The Executive Summary of the Jane’s Information Group’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments, last updated 13 August 2010, stated:
“Syria’s 1.7 million Kurds represent the largest, most persistent and potentially the most coherent source of popular disaffection toward the country’s Arab nationalist regime. The Kurdish opposition, comprising more than a dozen banned political parties, was for a long time united under Sheikh Mohammed Mashouq al?Khaznawi, a moderate cleric. However, in May 2005, less than a month after he predicted regime change for Syria in the Canadian press, al-Khaznawi disappeared in Damascus. The discovery of his body on 1 June brought tens of thousands of Kurdish protesters onto the streets of Al Qamishli. Al-Khaznawi’s death removed an important organising force behind the Kurdish opposition movements and has stalled home-grown efforts to force a redressing of major grievances. Kurdish expectations, however, remain high, and calls for change have grown increasingly bold. It is unlikely that the regime will offer any real concessions in the near future as Assad cautiously eyes developments in the Kurdish region of Iraq. The Syrian-Turkish-Iranian consensus on the Kurdish issue at the regional level, and the moderation of Iraqi Kurds’ demands for autonomy constitute significant factors that have lowered Syrian Kurdish expectations and opportunities for separation from, or regime change in, Syria.” [8a]
15.28 Various sources consulted for the May 2010 DIS and ACCORD/Austrian Red Cross joint fact finding mission report, Human rights issues concerning Kurds in Syria, agreed that Kurdish political parties were primarily personality driven; consequently “… cases of fractioning are usually the result of personal differences and not the result of ideological disagreements.” [60a] (p21) A Western diplomatic source stated:
“… [the Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat, Democratic Union Party] PYD is the one Kurdish political party that distinguishes itself from the other Kurdish political parties. The PYD is the best organised and disciplined Kurdish political party. While other Kurdish parties have more open and personality driven leadership processes, PYD is based on strict and secretive membership and leadership rules. PYD’s estimated 1,000 members in Syria are considered to be very active.” [60a] (p21)
See also Annex B – Political organisations
15.29 The HRW November 2009 report, Group Denial – Repression of Kurdish Political and Cultural Rights in Syria, noted:
“Both in connection with suppressing public demonstrations, and separately, Syrian security services have pursued individual Kurdish political leaders and activists. A Kurdish activist told Human Rights Watch in April 2009, ‘There used to be a red line on detaining known Kurdish political leaders. But since 2004, this line is no longer there.’ While security services detained some Kurdish leaders for a few hours only, they referred others for prosecution before military courts, which often sentenced them to jail. …
“The security forces have focused particularly on arresting members of five political parties: Yekiti, the Kurdish Future Movement, Azadi, the KDP-S [Kurdish Democratic Party of Syria], and the PYD [Hezb al-Ittihad al-dimocrati]. According to Kurdish political activists, the authorities have focused on Yekiti, Azadi, and the Future Movement Party because these three parties frequently organize demonstrations and are more explicit in demanding recognition of Kurdish rights. The harassment of PYD members, according to members of the party and outside observers, is because of Syria’s security agreement with the Turks, and the PYD’s ability to mobilize large crowds.” [39d] (p31)
The report went on to detail specific instances of the arrest, detention and/or prosecution of members of these five Kurdish parties, and the Kurdish Left Party in Syria, in 2007, 2008 and 2009. [39d] (p31-43)
See also Relations with Turkey, Human rights violations by the security forces, Judiciary, Arrest and detention – legal rights, Freedom of association and assembly and Annex B – Political organisations
15.30 The USSD Report 2009 stated, “The government was especially harsh toward individuals allegedly involved in Kurdish political or civil society activism.” [7b] (Section 1e) Further, “Kurdish citizens were especially likely to face torture in custody, according to an HRW report released November 26 [2009].” [7b] (Section 1c) The USSD Report 2009 related over a dozen specific cases where the Syrian authorities detained, arrested and/or prosecuted Kurds – at least some of whom were tortured – for their actual or imputed political activities, or for ‘unknown reasons’ in 2009. [7b] (Sections 1c, 1d, 1e, 2b, 6)
See also Human rights violations by the security forces,
15.31 The Human Rights Watch’s (HRW) World Report 2010, released January 2010 stated:
“Security forces detained at least nine prominent Kurdish political leaders in 2009, including, on January 10, Mustapha Jum’a, acting general secretary of the Azadi Party. On April 14 a military court sentenced two Yekiti party leaders, Fuad ‘Aliko and Hasan Saleh, to 8 and 13 months in prison respectively for membership in an unlicensed political organization. On May 11 a criminal court sentenced Mesh`al Tammo, spokesperson for the Kurdish Future Movement in Syria, to three-and-a-half years in prison for ‘weakening national sentiments’ and ‘broadcasting false information.’ On October 20 a criminal court sentenced Ibrahim Berro, a Yekiti party leader, to eight months in prison for membership in an unlicensed political organization.” [39b] (p4)
15.32 HRW’s 11 March 2010 article, Syria: Repression Grows as Europe, US Avoid Discussing Rights, stated:
“Security forces also have cracked down on political activists, particularly Kurdish leaders. On December 26 [2009], Political Security detained four prominent members of the Kurdish party Yekiti: Hassan Saleh, Muhammad Mustapha, Ma’ruf Mulla Ahmad, and Anwar Naso. All four remain in incommunicado detention. In a recent report, Human Rights Watch documented the increased repression of Syria’s Kurds following large-scale Kurdish demonstrations in March 2004.” [39e]
15.33 Various sources consulted for the May 2010 DIS and ACCORD/Austrian Red Cross joint fact finding mission report, Human rights issues concerning Kurds in Syria, agreed that both high and low level Kurdish party members and sympathisers were at risk of arrest, detention and/or trial. [60a] (p26-28)
“Rachel Raenell Bernu, KHRP, stated that within the last year several prominent political persons and several human rights activists whom were not expected to be in risk of being arrested have in fact been arrested. However, the general pattern concerning who is in risk of being arrested has not changed. Political party members are treated more harshly than others. Bernu could not state the names of the low?profile Kurdish political activists who have been arrested lately. Arrests of individuals or small groups of Kurdish political activists who are not well?known often go unreported. On the other hand arrests on a larger scale are usually reported in the media. Being a member of a political party in Syria does not in itself imply that a person is active for the party, and the Kurdish political parties use whoever can help them.
“Representatives of a Kurdish human rights organisation remarked that the courts generally do not distinguish between Kurdish low?level party members and high?level party members. Kurdish political leaders might receive a harder sentence than low?level party members, but in general it does not matter whether the person at trial is a human rights activist, an ordinary member of a Kurdish political party or a party leader.” [60a] (p27)
15.34 Throughout the same report, the various sources repeatedly noted that there was a high degree of arbitrariness in the behaviour of the security forces towards Kurds in terms of arrest, treatment during and length of detention, and trial. [60a] Whilst the higher a activist’s visibility in terms of their participation in political or cultural activities the more likely they were to attract the attention of the authorities, a Kurdish journalist and human rights activist also stated, “Persons are picked randomly by the security services, regardless of their degree of political activity or their political ranks. It was added that there are generally no rules for the function of the security services in Syria. Sometimes the security forces arrest persons unfoundedly.” [60a] (p26) Further:
“According to Ahmad Safa, journalist, KRI, most of Kurds who are arrested, harshly treated and even killed by the Syrian government are young persons who very often do not have a strong – if any – affiliation with Kurdish political parties. The source added that elder Kurds and political activists are very often ‘only’ put in jail, and they are not exposed to same harsh treatment as the young generation.
“A[nother] Western diplomatic source stated that representatives of political parties are treated relatively better by the security services than grassroots activists.” [60a] (p28)
Refer to the full May 2010 DIS and ACCORD/Austrian Red Cross report on their joint fact finding mission, Human rights issues concerning Kurds in Syria, for more information. [60a]
15.35 The HRW February 2009 report, Far From Justice – Syria’s Supreme State Security Court, reported:
“The arrest and trials of Kurdish activists is part of the broader Syrian policy of suppressing the demands for cultural rights and increased autonomy by the Kurdish minority in Syria. …
“The most common accusation against Kurdish activists is undertaking any ‘acts, speeches, writings or other means to cut-off part of Syrian land to join it to another country’ (Art. 267 of the Penal Code). The SSSC invoked this provision against at least 16 defendants between January 2007 and June 2008, the vast majority of whom had only participated in peaceful activities. Examples include sentencing activists for presenting a petition to the National Assembly to ‘remove the barriers imposed on the Kurdish language and culture’ or for participating in a peaceful demonstration to demand that Syrian authorities allow Kurdish children to learn in their own language.” [39c] (p5)
Refer to the February 2009 HRW report, Far From Justice – Syria’s Supreme State Security Court, for more information on the trials of Kurdish activists. [39c]
See also Fair trial, Freedom of speech and media and Kurds
15.36 Freedom House’s Freedom in the World – 2010 reported:
“Suspected Kurdish activists are routinely dismissed from schools and public?sector jobs. … While one demonstration to demand more rights for the Kurdish community was allowed to take place in northern Syria, security forces stopped four demonstrations in February and March, detaining dozens of people and referring some to the judiciary for prosecution. Intelligence services generally monitor Kurdish leaders closely, sometimes excluding them and their families from public-sector employment. At least 15 such leaders are barred from leaving Syria.” [14a] (Political Rights and Civil Liberties)
15.37 The HRW November 2009 report, Group Denial – Repression of Kurdish Political and Cultural Rights in Syria, also detailed similar harassment of Kurdish activists and their families. [39d] (p51-52) Additionally, the report noted the security forces continued to call activists in for interrogation even after their release, and “… regularly arrange for Kurdish activists [and their family members in public employment] to be relocated to faraway posts as a way of punishing them…”. [39d] (p51)
15.38 The Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, Githu Muigai – Addendum – Summary of cases transmitted to governments and replies received of 21 May 2010 recounted specific allegations of mistreatment received on the arrest, detention and mistreatment of unnamed Kurdish activists, and their families in 2008 and 2009. [56a] (p28-31)
See also Surveillance, Kurds and Exit and return
…
Kurds
20.03 The USSD Background Note, last updated February 2010, reported “The Kurds, many of whom speak the banned Kurdish language, make up 9% of the population and live mostly in the northeast corner of Syria, though sizable Kurdish communities live in most major Syrian cities as well.” [7a] (People)
20.04 The May 2010 report, Human rights issues concerning Kurds in Syria, of a joint fact-finding mission by the Danish Immigration Service (DIS) and ACCORD/Austrian Red Cross to Damascus, Syria, Beirut, Lebanon, and Erbil and Dohuk, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), noted:
“The vast majority [of the Kurdish population in Syria] is Sunni and speaks its own distinct language, Kirmanji. Kurds live in large numbers along the borders with Iraq and Turkey in three areas of concentration: the Jazira in the northeast, the ‘Ain ‘Arab region in the north, and the highlands in the northwest around ‘Afrin (also known as Kurd Dagh (Mountain of the Kurds)). There are also sizeable Kurdish populations in Aleppo and Damascus.” [60a] (p7)
20.05 The USSD Report 2009 stated, “Although the government contended there was no discrimination against the Kurdish population, it placed limits on the use and teaching of the Kurdish language. It also restricted the publication of books and other materials in Kurdish, Kurdish cultural expression, and at times the celebration of Kurdish festivals.” [7b] (Section 6)
20.06 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) Annual Report on Human Rights 2009, reported:
“Syria’s estimated 1.7 million Kurds continue to suffer from discrimination, lack of political representation, and tight restrictions on social and cultural expression. In particular, there are a number of measures in place repressing Kurdish identity, through restricting the use of the Kurdish language in public, in schools and in the workplace. Kurdish-language publications are banned and celebrations of Kurdish festivities, such as Nowruz, the traditional Kurdish New Year, are prohibited.
“In addition, as many as 300,000 Kurds continue to be denied recognised citizenship. Presidential Decree 49, which was passed in October 2008, still remains in force. This questions the rights of Syrian citizens to hold property rights in the border areas of the country and particularly affects the Kurdish population. Kurds in Syria claim that it effectively prohibits them from selling, buying or inheriting land.” [5b] (p159)
For more information, see the International Support Kurds in Syria Association – SKS August 2010 report, Decree 49 – ethnic cleansing of Kurds in Syria. [48c]
20.07 Amnesty International’s Annual Report 2010 stated, “Kurds, who comprise up to 10 per cent of the population and reside mostly in the north-east, continued to face identity-based discrimination, including restrictions on use of their language and culture. Thousands were effectively stateless and so denied equitable access to social and economic rights.” [12b] (p316) Human Rights Watch’s (HRW) World Report 2010, released January 2010 also reported that “Kurds, Syria’s largest non-Arab ethnic minority, remain subject to systematic discrimination, including the arbitrary denial of citizenship to an estimated 300,000 Syria-born Kurds. Authorities suppress expressions of Kurdish identity, and prohibit the teaching of Kurdish in schools.” [39b] (p4)
20.08 The May 2010 DIS and ACCORD/Austrian Red Cross fact finding mission report, Human rights issues concerning Kurds in Syria reported, “According to representatives of the UN Development Programme (UNDP), Syria, there is no discrimination of ethnic groups, including Kurds, concerning their access to health or education since the fees for these services are very small and nobody is required to present ID in order to access the services.” [60a] (p58) The report went into more detail concerning the ability of stateless Kurds to access public services, see Stateless Kurds. [60a]
See also Children and Medical issues
20.09 Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2010, stated:
“The Kurdish minority faces severe restrictions on cultural and linguistic expression. The 2001 press law requires that owners and top editors of print publications be Arabs. … In 2009, the government made it more difficult to hire noncitizens, resulting in the dismissal of many Kurds. While one demonstration to demand more rights for the Kurdish community was allowed to take place in northern Syria, security forces stopped four demonstrations in February and March, detaining dozens of people and referring some to the judiciary for prosecution. Intelligence services generally monitor Kurdish leaders closely, sometimes excluding them and their families from public-sector employment. At least 15 such leaders are barred from leaving Syria.” [14a] (Political Rights and Civil Liberties)
20.10 The Kurdish Human Rights Project (KHRP) Impact Report 2009 noted, “In 2009, the arrest and incommunicado detention of Kurds peacefully attempting to promote Kurdish culture, was an ongoing concern. So too were the continued violations of the rights to free expression and association against political activists.” [61a] (p24)
See also Surveillance and Political affiliation
20.11 The USSD Report 2009 stated, “Security services arrested hundreds of Kurdish citizens during the year [2009], and the SSSC [Supreme State Security Court] prosecuted them, in some cases on charges of seeking to annex part of Syria to another country.” [7b] (Section 6)
The report went on to relate over a dozen specific instances when the Syrian authorities detained, arrested and/or prosecuted Kurds, some but not all known political activists, during 2009. The report also noted that the reasons for arrest and whereabouts of many of these Kurds remained unknown at the end of 2009. [7b] (Sections 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e, 2a, 2b, 6)
20.12 The FCO Annual Report on Human Rights 2009 related brief details of the arrest and abuse of Kurds during 2009 for political reasons, or ostensibly for expression of their cultural identity at events, such as the celebration of the Kurdish New Year (Newroz). [5b] (p159)
20.13 Sources consulted for the May 2010 DIS and ACCORD/Austrian Red Cross fact finding mission report, Human rights issues concerning Kurds in Syria, noted the difficulty in separating Kurdish cultural and political activities in terms of the perception of the Syrian authorities:
“… a Western diplomatic source stated that the government and state security services undoubtedly are quite sensitive to any cultural or political sign of Kurdish nationalism which could be perceived by the state as a threat to the national integrity, or any form of resistance to the state authorities. That is the reason why the government reacts harshly to Kurdish cultural activities.
“[The same source] went on to explain that Kurdish cultural activities are generally perceived as political by the government, and it is therefore difficult to distinguish between political and non?political activities. When Kurdish cultural activities are banned by the authorities, they also politicise ordinary people participating in those activities. Participants in Kurdish cultural activities are therefore at risk of being criminalized and exposed to persecution by the authorities.” [60a] (p40)
See the full DIS and ACCORD/Austrian Red Cross fact finding mission report, Human rights issues concerning Kurds in Syria, of May 2010 for more detailed information. [60a]
See also Human rights violations by the security forces, Fair trial and Kurdish political activists
Death of Kurdish conscripts
20.14 The FCO Annual Report on Human Rights 2009 noted the reporting of 19 cases of Kurdish deaths during military service in the last five years, “The Syrian authorities say the deaths are suicides, but human rights defenders say autopsy evidence points to death by torture or shooting that could not have been self?inflicted.” [5b] (p159)
20.15 The USSD Report 2009 noted:
“During the year [2009] at least 18 Kurdish soldiers died under mysterious circumstances while performing their required service in the military, bringing the total number of Kurdish conscript deaths over the last five years to at least 36. Authorities frequently attributed the deaths to suicide or accidents, but Kurdish human rights activists and victims’ families asserted the deaths were deliberate government killings and demanded the government investigate them. In many cases security agents reportedly monitored preburial proceedings and prevented autopsies. In at least one case, according to a Kurdish human rights organization, authorities warned the family not to ask questions about the soldier’s death or to discuss it publicly. Authorities failed to provide documentary evidence to families of the men who reportedly committed suicide.” [7b] (Section 1a)
20.16 Sources consulted for the May 2010 DIS and ACCORD/Austrian Red Cross fact finding mission report, Human rights issues concerning Kurds in Syria, noted that 16-20 Kurdish conscripts had died during 2009, and 33-35 Kurdish deaths had occurred during military service between 2004 to 2009. [60a] (p66) A Kurdish journalist and human rights activist informed the fact finding mission that, “While these incidences were explained to be suicides by the government, the deceased person’s families indicated that they were killed. Some of the families to deceased Kurdish soldiers testified to human rights organisations that the bodies of the dead soldiers showed two or three bullet holes, each of which being lethal.” [60a] (p66)
20.17 A 10 June 2010 communiqué by the non-governmental organisation Alkarama reported:
“Since the 2004 incidents [in Qamishli], dozens of ethnic Kurds have died while performing their compulsory Syrian military duty, however the authorities claim that their deaths were caused either by heart attack, injury during the breakdown of military vehicles or a health crisis. However, the families of the victims have proof indicating otherwise; they confirmed that they saw gunshot wounds and bruises caused by torture on the bodies of their loved ones.
“The phenomenon of ethnic Kurds dying while on Syrian military duty has become the cause of major concern amongst the families of ethnic Kurdish soldiers. Military service is compulsory in Syria and many now fear that for their lives in a place which is supposedly intended to be safe.” [49a]
See also Military service
Stateless Kurds
See also The census of Al-Hasakah province: 1962, and Arabization: 1960s–1970s and Citizenship and nationality
20.18 The USSD Report 2009 stated:
“Following the 1962 census, approximately 120,000 Syrian Kurds lost their citizenship. As a result, those individuals and their descendants remain severely disadvantaged in terms of social and economic opportunities and in receiving government services including health and education, as well as employment open only to citizens. Stateless Kurds had limited access to university education, and lack of citizenship or identity documents restricted their travel to and from the country. The UNHCR and Refugees International estimated there were approximately 300,000 stateless Kurds.
“Despite the president’s repeated promises to resolve the matter of stateless Kurds, most recently in his 2007 inauguration speech, there was no progress during the year [2009].” [7b] (Section 2d)
20.19 The same report also noted, “In general, … noncitizens, including stateless Kurds, can send their children to school and universities. Stateless Kurds are ineligible to receive a degree documenting their academic achievement.” [7b] (Section 6)
20.20 The May 2010 DIS and ACCORD/Austrian Red Cross fact finding mission report, Human rights issues concerning Kurds in Syria, stated:
“An international organisation pointed out that stateless Kurds are a very vulnerable group in Syria. Stateless Kurds are excluded from owning land, access to basic public health care services and having any public jobs. In practice though, stateless persons have access to the private health care system or to the public health care system if they have the right personal connections and sufficient financial means to pay the necessary bribes.” [60a] (p58)
20.21 Reporting further on access to health care, the report noted that UNDP representatives had remarked “… that stateless Kurds have unconditional access to education and health, as they are not required to show any ID either.” [60a] (p58) Conversely, other sources consulted by the fact finding mission indicated that stateless persons were not entitled to or were unable to access any, or all but basic free, health care. [60a] (p58)
20.22 On education, various sources consulted by the DIS and ACCORD/Austrian Red Cross reported that, while primary education was free and compulsory for all, secondary and higher education was not. [60a] (p61) Also, an international organisation “…stressed that most stateless Kurds face certain socioeconomic difficulties which makes them less likely to enrol their children in school. Furthermore, stateless Kurds have no ID cards and stateless children are not issued school certificates or exam papers.” [60a] (p61) Section 10 of the fact finding mission report recounted the differing views concerning the extent of illiteracy among persons who have finished primary school. [60a] (p62-63)
See also Children and Medical issues
20.23 A diplomatic source consulted for the May 2010 DIS and ACCORD/Austrian Red Cross fact finding mission report, Human rights issues concerning Kurds in Syria, noted, “Most stateless Kurds generally do not have the economic means to travel to Europe in order to apply for asylum.” [60a] (p14) Also, “A representative of an international relief organisation confirmed that due to poverty it is more difficult for the stateless Kurds to find the means to leave the country compared to other Syrian Kurds.” [60a] (p14) The same report also noted, on internal movement, that “Stateless persons are restricted in their movement in the country as they cannot check in hotels without permission by the security services.” [60a] (p59)
20.24 Underlining the economic disadvantages faced by stateless Kurds in Syria, the May 2010 DIS and ACCORD/Austrian Red Cross fact finding mission report, Human rights issues concerning Kurds in Syria, stated:
“According to a prominent Kurdish political leader stateless persons are subjected to various forms of discrimination. Following a new law, it is now prohibited to employ persons who have no ID card in the private sector as has been the case in the public sector. This means that if a stateless Kurd from al?Hassakeh goes to Aleppo, Damascus or other places in Syria, he cannot get employment in restaurants, hotels etc.” [60a] (p59)
See also Freedom of movement and Exit and return
Ajanibs (‘foreigners’) and Maktoumeen (‘concealed’)
20.25 Chatham House’s January 2006 paper, The Syrian Kurds: A People Discovered, noted that Ajanibs were Kurds who took part in the 1962 census but were stripped of their nationality whilst Maktoumeen were Kurds who did not take part in the census or were born of at least one Ajanib parent. [59a] (p4)
20.26 The April 2009 United States Institute for Peace (USIP) special report, The Kurds in Syria – Fueling Separatist Movements in the Region?, stated:
“Since 1962, the Syrian state has divided Kurds in Syria into three major demographic categories: Syrian Kurds, foreign Kurds [Ajanib], and ‘concealed’ Kurds [Maktoumeen]. Syrian Kurds have retained their Syrian nationality. Foreign Kurds were stripped of citizenship and registered in official archives as foreigners; in 2008, there were about 200,000 of them. Concealed Kurds are denationalized Kurds who have not been registered in official records at all and whom Syrian authorities characterize as concealed. Nearly 80,000 people belong to this category. Among the concealed Kurds are persons whose fathers are classified as foreigners and whose mothers are citizens, persons whose fathers are aliens and whose mothers are classified as concealed, and persons whose parents are both concealed. In addition, there are about 280,000 undocumented Kurds who reside in Syria but have no citizenship, according to Kurdish sources. No government statistics are available on this group.” [13b] (p2)
See also The census of Al-Hasakah province: 1962, and Arabization: 1960s–1970s
20.27 Refugee International’s January 2006 paper Buried Alive: Stateless Kurds in Syria reported that Ajanib’s and Maktoumeen were issued different identity documents to Syrian citizens:
“Most denationalized Kurds and their descendents are labeled Ajanib (‘foreigners’) and issued red identity cards by the Ministry of Interior, stating they are not Syrian nationals and are not entitled to travel. Even some children listed on red cards are listed under the statement, ‘His name was not in the survey of 1962,’ an irony given that they were born long after the date of the census. Replacing such documents or obtaining them for the first time poses particular problems, as they often involve paying large bribes of up to SY P 3,000-5,000 (US $60-100) and approaching several branches of security for authorization over the course of months or even years.
“A significant number of stateless Kurds in Syria do not possess even this identity document and are effectively invisible. Maktoumeen now number between 75,000 and 100,000. At one time, they were able to obtain certified ‘white papers’ recognizing their identity from their local mayor’s office (a Mukhtar or traditional village head), although these papers were not recognized legally by the government. However, this practice has now ended under special orders from the Syrian government.” [40b] (p3)
20.28 The USIP report of April 2009 also stated:
“Kurds classified as foreigners carry red identity cards that permit them to be recorded as aliens in official records. They cannot, however, obtain a passport or leave the country. Concealed Kurds carry only a yellow definition certificate, or residence bond, issued by a local mukhtar (chieftain) and used purely to identify the holders whenever authorities found it necessary to do so. Though authorities issue the certificates, official Syrian institutions do not accept them, so for all intents and purposes the holders of yellow documents have no official status in Syria at all.” [13b] (p3)
20.29 Refugee International’s January 2006 paper included a table detailing whether a marriage – and the children of such a union – can be legally registered:
Failed asylum seekers
31.11 The Kurdish Human Rights Project’s (KHRP) June 2010 Submission to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, reported “… some Syrian nationals who have been returned to the country after living abroad have been arbitrarily detained on arrival or shortly after their return. To seek asylum abroad is perceived as manifestation of opposition to the Syrian government, so returned asylum seekers face the likelihood of arrest.” [61b] (p42)
31.12 In its Impact Report 2009, the KHRP remarked that it was:
“… increasingly concerned by the arbitrary detention of Kurds who were forcibly returned to Syria. In September [2009], Khaled Kenjo was held incommunicado and charged with ‘spreading ‘false’ news abroad’ under Article 287 of the Syrian Penal code after his failed appeal for political asylum in Germany. Similarly, Berzani Karro, forcibly returned from Cyprus to Syria in June, was arrested at Damascus Airport, held incommunicado and reportedly tortured.” [61a] (p25)
31.13 A June 2010 release by the International Support Kurds in Syria Association – SKS, Call to Cyprus Government to stop deportation of Kurds to Syria, noted:
“On 11 June 2010, twenty-seven people including women and children, were forcibly removed by authorities in Cyprus, back to Damascus airport. They had been on hunger strike along with many others for some time in Cyprus. Others remain in Cyprus. On return to Damascus, they were each interviewed by the authorities, and were issued with a summons to report to intelligence security a week later.” [48d]
31.14 In the May 2010 DIS and ACCORD/Austrian Red Cross fact?finding mission report a number of sources agreed that failed asylum seekers and persons who had left Syria illegally would generally face detention and investigation upon return. [60a] (p55-56)
“[A Western diplomatic source] mentioned that the computer system employed at border controls to screen persons upon their entry into Syria works well. Border guards check whether the name of someone who enters Syria can be found on one of the wanted persons lists of the security services. These lists contain information from the various security services’ offices from all parts of the country, including from Qamishli. Immigration authorities are thus able to see whether a returnee has a file with the security services somewhere, and can subsequently inquire about the file’s details with the authorities from these cities or municipalities. It was added that there is no single list of wanted persons but that every security agency maintains its own list. If one of the security services has a file concerning a returnee, he or she would be transferred from the immigration services’ detention facilities to the security agency’s detention centre.
“A[nother] Western diplomatic source stated that if somebody is called in for interrogation by the security services and the person does not show up, he would be arrested, and if his absence is due to the fact that he has left the country, he would be put on the list of wanted persons. Upon return to Syria, such a person would be arrested and interrogated by the security service. However, it was emphasized that it is very hard to say what exactly would happen in such cases.” [60a] (p56)
31.15 An Amnesty International Urgent Action of April 2010 reported:
“Hassan Baroudi (aged about 23) and Kutiba al-Issa were returned to Damascus around 17 March and have not been heard from since. Hassan Baroudi was studying electrical engineering in Malaysia; according to the Syrian Human Rights Committee in London, Kutiba al-Issa was studying political science.
On 21 January [2010], Hassan Baroudi, Kutiba al-Issa and at least 47 others attended an Islamic religious class held by Muslim preacher and Syrian national Sheikh Aiman al-Dakkak, in Malaysia’s capital, Kuala Lumpur. Police raided the class, detaining all those present under Malaysia’s Internal Security Act, which allows for detention without charge for two years or more. According to the Malaysian human rights group SUARAM (an acronym for Voice of the Malaysian People in Malay), the detainees were later released, apart from 12 foreign nationals including Hassan Baroudi, Kutiba al-Issa and Sheikh Aiman al-Dakkak.
“Hassan Baroudi’s mother visited him in detention in Malaysia. He told her that he had been questioned once but not charged with any offence. Later, he and Kutiba al-Issa were deported to Damascus via Dubai. According to Hassan Baroudi’s family, the Malaysian authorities said they had released him without charge or condition. The last Hassan Baroudi’s family heard from him was an SMS message sent while on board a plane to Damascus.
“Sources in Syria suggest that Hassan Baroudi may be held by Syria’s State Security department while Kutiba al-Issa is thought to be detained in the Military Intelligence-run Palestine Branch interrogation and detention centre in Damascus, which are both known as places where detainees are tortured.” [12g]
Kurdish parties and alliances – overview
The United States Institute for Peace (USIP) April 2009 report, The Kurds in Syria – Fueling Separatist Movements in the Region?, provided the background information on Kurdish political organisation in Syria:
“At the beginning of Syria’s existence as an independent state, politicians and officials of Kurdish descent occasionally boasted a modest yet noticeable presence in many state institutions, including high offices. Husni al-Zaim, who led the first military coup in Syria and became president in 1949, was Kurdish, as were Muhsin al-Barazi and other political luminaries of the 1940s and 1950s. Kurds maintained strong participation in political parties, particularly that of the communists, whose leader, Khaled Bakdash, was himself a Kurd. Many influential clerics, such as the former state mufti, Ahmed Kiftarro, were Kurdish as well.
“However, the Syrian government grew increasingly authoritarian, particularly with the rise of the Baath Party, and adopted increasingly discriminatory measures against the Kurds. The Kurdish movement began to experience internal cleavages. By 1965, the Kurdish parties had fragmented into numerous organizations divided over issues such as whether to work for Kurdish autonomy or work within the Communist Party and reject any Kurdish affiliation.” [13b] (p5)
HRW’s November 2009 report, Group Denial – Repression of Kurdish Political and Cultural Rights in Syria, noted:
“Today, at least 14 unlicensed Kurdish parties operate in Syria. Many of these parties are divided, and alliances between them are often short-lived and depend on personalities. The parties are fairly consistent in their calls for democracy in Syria and for recognizing Kurds as an ethnic group. Unlike the response of Kurds in Turkey or Iran to government repression, the Syrian Kurdish parties never took up arms against the government.” [39d] (p14)
The February 2010 ESISC paper, Does the Syrian opposition have the resources to match its ambitions?, also reported that the Kurdish “…opposition is particularly divided and splintered. In fact it numbers more than a dozen parties, most of which are active either in the Kurdish region of Syria or abroad (Germany, Netherlands etc.).” [38a] (p4)
The paper continued, “The Kurdish parties claim to be peaceful militants and obviously are hoping for greater civil liberties but, above all and in a most utopian fashion, they hope to gain autonomy for the Kurdish region. The eternal divisions which undermine the Kurdish opposition are principally due to rivalries among its leaders; they hinder the emergence of a unified platform and of clear, but above all shared demands.” [38a] (p4)
For more information on the history and divisions of Kurdish political parties in Syria, see the May 2010 report, Human rights issues concerning Kurds in Syria, of the joint fact finding mission by the Danish Immigration Service (DIS) and ACCORD/Austrian Red Cross to Syria, Lebanon, and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) from 21 January to 8 February 2010. [60a] (3. Targeted groups and persons in relation to political activities & Annex 3: Kurdish Parties in Syria)
The USIP April 2009 report, The Kurds in Syria – Fueling Separatist Movements in the Region?, noted:
“The Kurdish presence in the Damascus Declaration has provided a good starting point for the Kurds to move out of their isolation in cities such as Qamishli, Ein al?Arab, and Efrin, and begin to be players in the wider Syrian prodemocratic political scene. The declaration also has given the Syrian opposition a national dimension, as the source of its legitimacy came from both Arabs and Kurds. Today, the Kurdish Front and the Kurdish Alliance act in relative coordination with their Arab counterparts.” [13b] (p6)
Parties
Listed alphabetically
Democratic Kurdish ‘Party’ – Syria
Leader: Dr. Tawfeeq Hamadush (in Germany); prominent figure: Hassan Kamil (Human rights issues concerning Kurds in Syria, DIS and ACCORD, May 2010) [60a] (p84)
Democratic Union Party (PYD)
Leader: Fouad ‘Omar (Human rights issues concerning Kurds in Syria, DIS and ACCORD, May 2010) [60a] (p83)
A Western diplomatic source consulted for the May 2010 DIS and ACCORD report, Human rights issues concerning Kurds in Syria, stated that “The PYD is the best organised and disciplined Kurdish political party. While other Kurdish parties have more open and personality driven leadership processes, PYD is based on strict and secretive membership and leadership rules. PYD’s estimated 1,000 members in Syria are considered to be very active.” [60a] (p21)
Kurdish Azadi Party
Leader: Khair Al-Din Morad; prominent figures: Bashar Ameen, Mustafa Jam’aa (Human rights issues concerning Kurds in Syria, DIS and ACCORD, May 2010) [60a] (p83)
Kurdish Democratic Equality Party
Leader: ‘Aziz Dawood (Human rights issues concerning Kurds in Syria, DIS and ACCORD, May 2010) [60a] (p81-82)
Kurdish Democratic Party
Leader: Dr. Abdul Hakeem Bashar; prominent figures: Saoud Al-Mullah, Dr. Akram Al?Mullah, Tawfeeq Abdul Majeed, Ameen Kowali (Human rights issues concerning Kurds in Syria, DIS and ACCORD, May 2010) [60a] (p81)
Kurdish Democratic Party
Leader: Nasr Al-Din Ibrahim; prominent figure: Said Wadi (Human rights issues concerning Kurds in Syria, DIS and ACCORD, May 2010) [60a] (p80)
Kurdish Democratic Party of Syria (KDP-S/al-Parti)
A Western diplomatic source consulted for the May 2010 DIS and ACCORD report, Human rights issues concerning Kurds in Syria, stated this “… is the oldest and by far the largest Kurdish political party, and many Kurds have sympathy with this party. KDP-S has strong connections with Mustafa Barzani, the president of the Kurdish Regional Government in Northern Iraq and leader of KDP in KRI.” [60a] (p21)
HRW’s November 2009 report, Group Denial – Repression of Kurdish Political and Cultural Rights in Syria, stated:
“In 1957 a broad coalition of prominent Syrian Kurdish intellectuals calling for recognition of Kurdish rights, land reform, and democracy—but not Kurdish independence—founded the Kurdish Democratic Party of Syria (KDP-S). In addition to the KDP-S, the Syrian Communist Party, whose founder and many of its members were Kurds, often defended Kurdish ethnic rights. In 1960, however, the government launched a crackdown on Kurdish activists, arresting a number of KDP-S leaders and hundreds of supporters. Under the weight of severe government repression, the party quickly fragmented into competing factions and lost much of its support base.” [39d] (p13)
Kurdish Democratic Unity Party
Leaders: Muhi Al-Din Sheikh Ali and Ism’ail Omar; prominent figure: Habeeb Ibrahim (Human rights issues concerning Kurds in Syria, DIS and ACCORD, May 2010) [60a] (p80)
Kurdish Future Current
Leader Meshal Tammo; prominent figures: Reizan Sheikhmous, Harfain Awsi, Khaleel Hussein (Human rights issues concerning Kurds in Syria, DIS and ACCORD, May 2010) [60a] (p83)
Kurdish Leftist Party
Leader: Muhammad Mousa Muhammad (Human rights issues concerning Kurds in Syria, DIS and ACCORD, May 2010) [60a] (p81)
Kurdish Patriotic Democratic Party
Leader: Taher Sofuk. (Human rights issues concerning Kurds in Syria, DIS and ACCORD, May 2010) [60a] (p82)
Kurdish Yeketi Party
Leader Fouad Aliko; prominent figures: Hassan Salah, Abdul Baqi Al-Youssef, Abdul Samad Khalaf, Ism’ail Hami (Human rights issues concerning Kurds in Syria, DIS and ACCORD, May 2010) [60a] (p82)
Kurdistani Liberal Party
Leader: Abdul Kulo (in Iraqi Kurdistan) (Human rights issues concerning Kurds in Syria, DIS and ACCORD, May 2010) [60a] (p84)
Progressive Democratic Party
Leader: Abdul Hameed Darweesh; prominent figures: Faisal Youssef, Ali Shammadin; Tamr Mustafa, Ahmad Burakaat, Abdul Rahman Koujar (Human rights issues concerning Kurds in Syria, DIS and ACCORD, May 2010) [60a] (p80)
Syrian Democratic Kurdish Party
Leader: Jamaal Sheikh Baqi (Human rights issues concerning Kurds in Syria, DIS and ACCORD, May 2010) [60a] (p83)
Syrian Kurdish Democratic Harmony (Party)
Leader: Fawzi Shenghal; prominent figures: Naleen Qunbar, Salah Soufi Baro, Talal Muhammad (Human rights issues concerning Kurds in Syria, DIS and ACCORD, May 2010) [60a] (p84)
Alliances
The Kurdish Democratic Front (al-jabha)
The February 2010 ESISC paper noted this alliance is “… led by Abdul Hamid Darwish, which brings together three Kurdish parties;” [38a] (p4) The May 2010 DIS and ACCORD report, Human rights issues concerning Kurds in Syria noted this alliance included:
The Kurdish Democratic Party (leader: Dr. Abdul Hakeem Bashar)
The Kurdish Democratic Equality Party
The Kurdish Patriotic Democratic Party
[60a] (Annex 3: Political Parties)
The Democratic Kurdish Alliance in Syria (attakhafuf)
The February 2010 ESISC paper noted this alliance “… unites four parties but has no leader;” [38a] (p4)
The May 2010 DIS and ACCORD report, Human rights issues concerning Kurds in Syria noted this alliance included:
The Progressive Democratic Party
The Kurdish Democratic Party (leader: Nasr Al-Din Ibrahim)
The Kurdish Democratic Unity Party
The Kurdish Leftist Party
[60a] (Annex 3: Political Parties)
The Kurdish Committee for Coordination
The May 2010 DIS and ACCORD report, Human rights issues concerning Kurds in Syria noted this alliance included:
The Kurdish Yeketi Party
The Kurdish Azadi Party
The Kurdish Future Current party
[60a] (Annex 3: Political Parties)
The February 2010 ESISC paper also noted the existence of “A small alliance of three independent parties -Yekiti (united), Azadi (liberty) and the Movement of the Future;” [38a] (p4)
Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK)
HRW’s February 2009 report, Far From Justice – Syria’s Supreme State Security Court noted, “The last few years also have seen an increase in SSSC trials of members in the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) [of Turkey]. This represents a reversal in Syria’s policy as one of the main backers of the PKK against Turkey during the 1980s and 1990s. … Since the reversal in policy, Syrian security services have arrested a number of PKK members and Kurds expressing support for the PKK.” [39c] (p24-25)
[48] International Support Kurds in Syria Association – SKS http://supportkurds.org/about-sks/
a Syria, last entry dated 4 August 2010 on date of access http://supportkurds.org/sks/syria/
Date accessed 6 August 2010
b Reports, last entry dated 1 August 2010 on date of access http://supportkurds.org/sks/reports/
Date accessed 6 August 2010
c Decree 49 – ethnic cleansing of Kurds in Syria, 1 August 2010 http://supportkurds.org/reports/decree-49-ethnic-cleansing-of-kurds-in-syria/#more-2986
Date accessed 6 August 2010
d Call to Cyprus Government to stop deportation of Kurds to Syria, 15 June 2010 http://supportkurds.org/news/call-to-cyprus-government-to-stop-deportation-of-kurds-to-syria/#more-2694
Date accessed 6 August 2010
