Firat news: YPG liberates a town and four villages: People’s Defense Units (YPG) have liberated 4 more villages in the Til Hemis area near Tirbespiyê after liberating the town of Til Berik (Tell Brak), 45 km from Qami?lo, from armed groups affiliated to Al Qaeda.
According to YPG sources the YPG carried out an operation this morning against armed groups in the area between Qamishlo and Hesekê (al-Hasaka).
On the evening of 26 December there were violent clashes between YPG forces and armed groups of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), linked to Al Qaeda, in the vicinity of the villages of Ebu Xezef, Xenamiyê and upper and lower Bizoniyê near Til Hemis.
As a result of these clashes YPG forces ejected the Al Qaeda groups from 4 villages. The operation is continuing in the area.
5 cities, 6 towns and more than 100 villages liberated in 2013
The People’s Defence Units (YPG) have achieved great military success in 2013 in West Kurdistan. The Rojava revolution began with the people taking control of the town of Kobani (Ayn al-Arab) on July 19th 2012, and in 2013 at least 5 cities, 6 towns and over 100 villages have been liberated by the YPG. Amongst the places liberated are the border crossing of Til Kocher (Ya’rubiyya) on the road to Mosul and the city of Serêkaniyê (Ras al-Ayn) on the border of North Kurdistan.
War balance sheet
According to a balance sheet issued by the YPG on 22 December, 376 soldiers from the Syrian regime forces and 2,923 members of armed groups from ISIS and the Al Nusra front linked to Al Qaeda have been killed in clashes in 2013. In these clashes 379 members of the YPG and YPJ (women’s defence forces) have also been killed.
790 soldiers and police of the Syrian forces have also been taken prisoner, most of them being released or handed over to their families. 587 members of ISIS and the Al Nusra front, who are attacking the Kurds, have also been captured. The YPG, states that 91 of these are of foreign nationality.
In clashes 12 tanks, 145 tank shells, 7 armoured cars, 68 anti-aircraft weapons of various sizes, 240 vehicles, 43 military vehicles, 27 mortars, 560 mortar shells, two 122 millimetre shells, 147 shells 35 RPGs and 980 RPG grenades were seized.
19 Karnas sniper rifles, 11 M16 rifles, 38 BKC machine guns, 2967 AK 47s, 421 pistols, 84 tonnes of explosives and mines, 7 Katyusha rockets, 38 night sights, 297 pairs of binoculars, 4 small mortars, 5 Dojeh shells, 95 walkie-talkies and telephones, 9 cameras, 16 laptops, 2900 hand grenades, 78 missiles of various size and type and 548 thousand Kalashnikov and BKC rounds were also seized. 9 tanks, 6 armoured cars, 56 vehicles and large amounts of ammunition were also destroyed in clashes during the year.
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Syrian Observatory for Human Rights: Final death toll for Friday 27/12/2013: More than 260 people killed.
The dead: 67 civilians (including 8 children and 4 women), 77 rebels, 11 unidentified rebels, 19 non-Syrian ISIS, 27 NDF, 5 Abu al-Fadel, 54 regular soldiers, 1 defected officer.
By province: Reef Dimashq (39 civilians*, 5 rebels). Aleppo (21 civilians**, 1 rebel). Der’a (2 civilians, 1 rebel). Homs (7 civilians, 2 rebels). Damascus (6 civilians***). Idlib (2 civilians, 2 rebels). Deir Ezzour (1 rebel).
* 6 civilians killed by a surface-to-surface missile on south Reef Dimashq. 7 civilians died of wounds from regime bombardment on Rankous, Khan al-Sheikh, Douma and Madaya. 6 civilians (A woman and her 3 sons, a man and a child) were killed by bombardment on parts of Adra. 10 men died of land-mines in the Qalamoun area, as reported by activists.
**7 civilian inmates in the Aleppo Central Prison died of malnutrition and lack of medical supplies. The prison is besieged by al-Nusra and other Islamist rebel groups.
***5 civilians, including an elderly man, a disabled man and a woman, died of malnutrition and lack of medical supplies in the besieged Yarmouk Palestinian Refugee Camp, besieged for months by regime forces.
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No less than 65 islamist rebels were killed by a regime ambush in the al-Qastal area of the Qalamoun, Reef Dimashq.
A defected soldier with the rank of captain was killed by clashes with regime forces in the Deir Ezzour military airport.
11 unidentified rebels were killed by clashes and bombardment.
19 non-Syrian fighters from ISIS, al-Nusra and other Islamist factions were killed by clashes and targeted bombardment.
5 fighters from Liwa Abu al-Fadel al-Abbas, a pro-regime militia that includes non-Syrian fighters, were killed by clashes with ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra in Reef Dimashq.
27 National Defence Forces militiamen were killed by clashes and attacks on their checkpoints.
54 regular soldiers, including 5 officers, killed by clashes, snipers, bombardment and attacks on vehicles and checkpoints: 13 Damascus and Reef Dimashq, 11 Deir Ezzour, 19 Hama, 5 Aleppo, 4 Idlib, 2 Homs.
Hasakah province: Reports that the YPG has taken over 5 villages by al-Qamishli city after violent clashes with the ISIS since midnight, sporadic clashes continue in the area with no reports of losses.
Aleppo province: 4 civilians were killed and 15 others injured by mortars falling on parts of the Jamiliya neighbourhood. Clashes continue in the Ashrafiya neighbourhood, by the old Efrin garage, between regime and rebel forces; reports of a destroyed regime military vehicle. Clashes continue between regime forces, supported by NDf and Hizbullah fighters, against the ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra and other Islamist rebel groups in the Tallat al-Sheikh Youssef area. Reports of ISIS advancements and the death of several regime forces. Parts of the Bustan al-Basha neighbourhood was bombarded by regime forces, no reports of casualties. In the countryside the airforce opened fire with heavy machine-guns on the towns of anadan and Hureitan, no reports of losses.
5 killed by malnutrition in al-Yarmouk: Damascus: 5 civilians, including an elderly man, a disabled man and a woman, died of malnutrition and lack of medical supplies in the Yarmouk Palestinian Refugee Camp, the humanitarian catastrophe is due to several months of siege imposed by the regime forces on the camp.
Reef Dimashq: Tens of Islamist rebel fighters were killed by a regime ambush at dawn today near the town of Qastal and the historic town of Ma’loula, 20 rebels were injured by the ambush with no reports of regime losses so far. Reports that 15 people were killed by landmines in the area between Yabrud and al-Nabek.
2 airstrikes on the city of Adra, also airstrikes on the edges of Asal al-Ward town. Parts of the orchards of Madaya and Boukein were bombarded by regime forces, several people were injured. 3 mortars were launched into the al-Assad suburb, no reports of losses.
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Reuters: Beirut bomb kills Lebanese ex-minister who opposed Assad
Why Syria’s Kurds are beating Al Qaeda – By Balint Szlanko – @balintszlanko
For Syria Comment, December 16. 2013
The Kurds of Syria have been in the news lately. Fighting—and beating—Al Qaeda-allied groups and other rebel militias in their struggle for Syria’s northeast, in the past year they have in effect set up their own ministate inside the country. Here is why they are winning.
1. Unified command and control structures. Unlike the rebel militias, the Kurdish armed group, the Yekineyen Parastina Gel (People’s Protection Units) or YPG, is controlled by a single general command. This allows it to effectively operate on a frontline more than 120 miles long by transferring people and other assets relatively easily to where the need arises and to coordinate operations effectively. Contrast this with its enemies, the mainly Arab rebels: they are splintered into at least six major groups (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, the Nusra Front, Ahrar al Sham, the Kurdish Islamic Front, the Tawheed Brigade, and the Free Syrian Army, itself an umbrella organisation of smaller groups) that have a patchy record of coordination. Indeed, some of the rebel groups that fight together against the Kurds have often fought each other elsewhere.
2. Superior tactical skills and discipline. It’s hard to be entirely sure of this because YPG commanders provide journalists with only limited access to their operations. That said, the YPG frontline positions and checkpoints I have seen tended to look well-organised with properly dug trenches and positions for machine-guns, snipers and spotters. Their checkpoints tend to have sandbags for protection, rather than blocks of cement, which are easier to transport and set up but give less protection against gunfire because they tend to splinter upon the bullet’s impact. There is also evidence that the YPG receives training from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a militant group that has decades of experience fighting the Turkish state. I met one PKK trainer in a town under YPG control who said he was teaching the YPG battlefield tactics.
3. Wide popular backing. The YPG’s political master, the Democratic Union Party or PYD, is not without its share of controversies and has plenty of detractors among the Kurds. But with only the YPG standing between the Islamists and the Kurdish towns, the militia is currently receiving plenty of genuine support from the population. This includes not only Kurds but Arabs and Christians, too, many of whom have much to fear from the rebels. The Kurdish areas are full of pictures of the YPG’s fallen, and funerals often turn into big celebrations that are not staged (though certainly encouraged). Contrast this with the enemy’s position: some of the rebel groups are feared, despised or even hated in the areas they control, partly because of the insecurity and corruption that have often followed them, and because the oppression some of the more extreme groups have instigated.
4. A powerful ideology. The YPG subscribes to a secular nationalism that has historically been highly effective as a force for mobilisation and war. Kurdish nationalism, which has so far been denied its own state, has a huge number of followers in the area and is less controversial than the ideology many rebels have subscribed to, political Islam. The Kurds’ ideology is also effective in that it doesn’t work to the exclusion of others: relations with the region’s minorities, Sunni Arabs and Christians, have so far been mostly good, thanks to the common enemy. Nationalism, of course, can easily turn into paranoid xenophobia, but so far there is not much evidence that this is happening.
5. A relatively open political system. The PYD has been often accused of cracking down on its political opponents and there is evidence that this has indeed been the case. That said, the political structure of the Kurdish autonomy is the most open in Syria right now, giving positions not just to the dominant PYD, but to its main political rival, the Kurdish National Council (itself an umbrella group of parties). In the recently announced temporary administration not just Kurds but also Christians have taken up positions. This helps ensure that representation—and therefore legitimacy and mobilisation—are on a far more solid ground than under the stifling dictatorship of the regime areas and the chaos of the rebel-controlled towns.
6. A good road network. The geographical shape of the Kurdish autonomy is in some sense unfortunate, being very wide and with a depth of only a few miles in places. Yet this also a source of luck, as there is a good paved road along the entire length of the area. This allows easy transport of troops and other assets from one part of the war zone to another. The entire of length of the autonomy can be travelled in half a day.
7. Access to fuel. Hasakah province is said to contain about 60 per cent of Syria’s (meagre) oil wealth. Not all of this is in Kurdish hands and most of the oil rigs are not working at the moment. That said, there is some refining going on, which provides the YPG with a reliable source of fuel for its trucks.
8. A safe and intact home front. The Kurds have so far avoided a clash with the government, which means they haven’t had to worry about airstrikes and artillery shelling. Many of Syria’s rebel-controlled cities, towns and villages have been reduced to rubble with little or no electricity and little food. These shortages always effect the civilians more than the fighters, but they still make it much harder to fight a war. They also tend to cause corruption and infighting, which the Kurds have so far been able to avoid.
9. Clever strategy. Many of the factors mentioned above stem from this. The Kurds have simple and clearly defined war aims—protecting and governing their own territories—and are focusing on the essentials to achieve this: running a single, well-organised security force, keeping hostiles—the Islamists and the FSA—out and compromising with those—the government—who present no immediate danger. They have also avoided looting and terrorising their own towns, unlike their opponents.
To be sure, the Kurds still face an uphill struggle. They are under embargo from all sides: the border crossings into Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan are closed, and until they can figure out the politics with their neighbours they will remain closed. This puts huge pressure on them economically and militarily. It is unclear where the YPG gets its weapons from but being under lockdown can’t be good. In this context, the recent capture of the Yaroubiya crossing into Iraq proper is a big success, because for the first time it gives them access to a non-hostile state.
The Kurds also face a well-supplied and dedicated—indeed fanatical—enemy that is unlikely to give up easily, though the recent government offensives in the west might refocus the rebels’ attention. The Kurds also have an odd relationship with the Syrian government, based essentially on a common enemy, the rebels. But this is not a real allience and could easily tip over. With the Syrian government still in control of an airfield and an artillery base in the middle of the Kurdish autonomy, things could quickly get ugly if that relationship breaks down.
Balint Szlanko is a freelance journalist who has covered Syria since early 2012 and has recently completed two trips to the Kurdish areas